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Education

2021 University of California, Los Angeles. Ph.D. in Political Science. June 2021.

2015 Joint Baccalaureate of Higher School of Economics and New Economic School. Bachelor of Arts in Economics.

Academic Positions

2023-present Assistant Professor, Ozyegin University, Department of Economics.

2021-2023 Postdoctoral researcher, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, QSMS research group.

Visiting Positions

January 2023 - University of Cyprus, working on a project "Logrolling and the power of single-mindedness".

Teaching

2024 Instructor: "Microeconomics", "Environmental Economics and Policy", Ozyegin University.

2022 Instructor: "Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in International Studies", RANEP. Instructor: "Writing rules to incentivize people", "Making decisions as a group", short intensive courses, Budapest University of Technology and Economics.

2021 Teaching Assistant: "Arms Control and International Security", UCLA. Instructor: International Relations, RANEP.

2020 Instructor: "Comparative Politics", The Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. Instructor: "Political Economics", Moscow State University. Teaching Assistant: "Political Economy of Climate Change", UCLA.

2019 Instructor: "Quantitative Methods in Political Science", The Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. Teaching Assistant: "Public Economics", Higher School of Economics.

2016-2019 Teaching Assistant: "Politics and Strategy", "World Politics", "International Political Economy", "Arms Control and International Security", Department of Political Science, UCLA.

2015 Teaching Assistant: "Game Theory", Higher School of Economics.

Publications

2021 "The fragmentation of views in a democracy." - *Economics of Governance* 22.3 (2021): 215-256.

Abstract: Are voters in democracies more competent if there are more media outlets? To answer this question, I provide a game-theoretic model of media capture and political persuasion in democratic countries. In the model, there are two politicians, the Incumbent and the Challenger. They co-opt the media by offering them access to information. In exchange, the media support politicians who are available for interviews or include journalists in press pools. Voters choose like-minded media. I show that if the Incumbent is sufficiently popular and has little policy information, then media bias in her favor weakly increases in the number of media outlets. Otherwise, media bias in the Incumbent's favor weakly decreases in the number of media outlets. The welfare of voters weakly increases and decreases in the respective cases. The intuition is that, in equilibrium, the Incumbent can co-opt only one media outlet and ensure that enough voters read it. In this case, media outlets compete for access to the Incumbent and agree for a higher bias as their number increases.

Working Papers

"Information agreements" (with Kemal Kivanç Aköz), Revise and Resubmit at "Journal of Economic Theory"

Abstract: We analyze a model where several agents bargain over an information structure. For example, political parties coordinate campaigns, or firms agree on disclosure standards. Disagreement benchmark could be no or full information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents. We show that an agreement exists if, for any coalition of agents of a fixed size, there is a receiver's belief that makes members better off, non-members worse off, and the sum of all payoffs higher than the benchmark. We then describe environments where symmetric and efficient agreements imply high but not complete transparency. Our results imply that agreement among agents with conflicting interests could generate more transparency than persuasion by a single sender.

"How can social media limit disinformation?"

Abstract: Political disinformation is dangerous for democracies. Social and government pressure made Facebook and Twitter start labeling posts that contain disinformation. This policy became known as fact-checking. Under which conditions will social media platforms fact-check? I propose a model in which two platforms decide whether to fact-check a politician. One of the platforms is ex-ante more attractive to voters than the other. The politician chooses which platforms to use and how often to misrepresent the state of the world if it is bad for her. In equilibrium, fact-checking is more likely if the politician has low approval or one of the platforms is highly more attractive than its competitor. The model's policy implication is that reducing market power for the dominant social media firm can make fact-checking less likely.

"Signaling effort" (with Noémie Cabau)

Abstract: We consider a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard where the agent commits to a signal that generates messages based on his effort. There is also an external signal about the agent's effort that he cannot control. The principal designs a payment scheme that depends on the joint signal. Both players are risk-neutral, and negative payments only enter the agent's payoff. If the agent provides information, the principal can pay less to incentivize his effort. The agent may benefit if providing information makes punishment less likely. Because of this trade-off, the agent may choose a signal such that he sometimes receives punishment when he expends high effort. The model applies to a scenario where a bureaucrat or manager can affect reports about his performance.

"Logrolling and the power of single-mindedness" (with Albert Sole Olle and Dimitrios Xefteris)

Abstract: We consider a committee that handles multiple issues, determining both the direction and extent of reforms for each, and investigate how logrolling affects outcomes. Our study provides a complete

formal account of decentralized vote-trading in such a setting, by establishing two key findings: a) an essentially unique competitive equilibrium always exists, and b) logrolling improves the welfare of every committee member, and implements the Nash bargaining solution. With sufficiently many issues, a single-minded delegate fully dictates policy within her domain of interest, reflecting the disproportional influence of single-issue minorities in representative democracies.

“Minorities in dictatorship and democracy”, available as APSA preprint, Revise and Resubmit at “Journal of Public Economic Theory”

Abstract: How does the level of democracy in a country affect the government’s treatment of ethnic minorities? I find that, on average, when the largest ethnic group in a society exceeds half of the population, ethnic minorities are treated better in autocracies and full democracies than in semi-democratic countries. The intuition is that under autocracy a leader needs little popular support, and therefore a coalition of several minorities can rule. By contrast, in a semi- democracy, the leader needs the support of more people, so a coalition of small ethnic groups is insufficient; the largest group is enough and no other groups are necessary. Finally, highly democratic countries require broad support, and most ethnic groups get benefits.

“Should Politicians be Informed? Targeted Benefits and Heterogeneous Voters” (with Maxim Senkov)

Abstract: Microtargeting allows politicians to design policies that target narrow groups of citizens by using fine-grained voter data. How does this practice affect the welfare of voters? The paper provides a model where the incumbent and the challenger compete for office by offering targeted benefits to voters. Voters differ in their affinities to the politicians and the value they derive from targeted benefits. We compare social welfare when politicians can make offers to voters with specific characteristics to a scenario where they choose the mass of benefits they are ready to provide, and then voters receive them uniformly at random. In the first scenario, which models microtargeting, politicians offer targeted benefits to swing voters who put a relatively high value on them. Moreover, microtargeting forces the incumbent to make more generous offers by making the challenger more effective in getting supporters. Both effects are present when the incumbent is sufficiently popular compared to the challenger. We present the conditions under which microtargeting benefits voters.

Presentations

2024 Social Choice and Welfare (Paris), Bilkent University (Ankara), Koç Workshop on Politics, Media and Information (Istanbul), Koç University (Istanbul), Sabanci University (Istanbul)

2023 Hungarian Academy of the Sciences Institute for Economics (Budapest), Oligo Workshop (Padova, presented virtually), University of Graz (Graz), Conference on Economic Design (Girona), GRAPE (Warsaw).

2022 Virtual seminar in information economics (Concordia University, online), Institute for Analytical Sociology (online), Hungarian Academy of the Sciences Institute of Political Science (Budapest), Virtual Formal Theory Seminar (online), Corvinus University in Budapest Institute for Economics seminar (Budapest), Corvinus University in Budapest seminar in Operations Research and Game Theory (Budapest), Nazarbayev University (online), CERGE-EI (Prague).

2021 Nazarbayev University (online), Budapest University of Technology (online), Masaryk University (online), ICSID Conference at the Higher School of Economics (online), Junior scholars’ formal theory symposium (online), Conference for Young Scientists in Mathematical Economics and Economic Theory (Saint Petersburg), Quantitative Methods in Governance (Budapest).

2020 Bar-Ilan University Ph.D. workshop (Ramat-Gan), Higher School of Economics International Center for Economics and Finance (Moscow, online), Higher School of Economics Game Theory Lab Seminar (Saint Petersburg, online), April Conference at the Higher School of Economics (online), University of California, Irvine Ph.D. workshop (online), Higher School of Economics (Saint Petersburg, online), Johannes

Kepler University Linz (online), Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (online), European University (Saint Petersburg, online), American Political Science Association (online), APSA Virtual Formal Theory Seminar (online)

2019 Moscow State University, Higher School of Economics (Moscow), Higher School of Economics (Saint Petersburg), International Meeting on Game Theory (Saint Petersburg), Conference on Economic Design (Budapest), Proseminar in Economic Theory at UCLA (Los Angeles).

2018 Midwest Political Science Association (Chicago).

Workshop Participation

2021 Machine learning mini-course, Hungarian Academy of the Sciences.

2020 Dynamics and Information Workshop, Tel Aviv University.

2017 28th Summer School in Economic Theory, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Honors and Awards

2020 Hayek Fund for Scholars.

2018-2019 Conference travel grants, UCLA.

2017-2019 Institute of Humane Studies Ph.D. Fellowship

2016 Institute of Humane Studies Ph.D. Scholarship, Graduate Dean Scholarship at UCLA

2011 All-Russian Olympiad in Economics, 2nd degree diploma, HSE Olympiad in Economics, 1st degree diploma.

Refereeing

“Journal of Politics”, “American Journal of Political Science”

Programming skills

Python, STATA, Mathematica